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ABSTRACT: This article explains the importance of mission command to joint operational effectiveness through the
experiences of the Australian and American armies. Guidance is
also given regarding the caveats of subordinate competencies
and experiences, which affect the appropriate application of the
leadership practice.

M

ilitary operations—whether combat, peacekeeping, or
humanitarian, whether single-country or multinational—are
complex and unpredictable. Intelligence, understanding
one’s own capabilities and limitations, and carefully crafted command
guidance at best lend limited insight into how to confront what lies ahead.
Adversaries seek to deceive and surprise. Environmental conditions
change. Leaders’ understanding of circumstances at the sharp end
increasingly dims the further up the chain of command one goes, even
in an era of communications capabilities undreamed of a generation ago.
The sergeant leading his squad sees what his platoon leader cannot. Those
at battalion, brigade, and higher know little of what confronts their trusts
below. The wise military leader recognizes unforeseeable events always
lie ahead. Those commanders, therefore, require subordinates be ready
to adapt to the unexpected.
Mission command—the practice of assigning a subordinate
commander a mission without specifying how the mission is to
be achieved—provides a means of addressing this challenge.1 The
United States is not the only country committed to practicing mission
command. Armies in Australia, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Singapore, and the United Kingdom have adopted the
familiar approach. Centuries old in concept and decades aged in military
doctrines, effective implementation has nonetheless proven elusive.
The following paragraphs focus on the Australian approach to
mission command. Australia and the United States have a long historical
partnership. The two countries’ soldiers served side by side in East
Timor, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Vietnam; on World War II battlefields;
and elsewhere. There is great value in learning from such allies and
colleagues akin to but different from ourselves.
This article presents mission command practices during recent
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, major predecessor confl icts from
World War I on, and in today’s Australian Army brigade. The events
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include both confrontations with armed foes distant from Australian
shores and disasters on the island continent itself.

US and Australian Perspectives

American and Australian views on mission command are similar
both in concept and in terms of the two countries’ expectations
regarding what the philosophy requires of senior and subordinate
leaders. Seniors must cultivate “implicit trust between and across all
elements of the land force” in such a way that subordinates develop
situational awareness that prepares them to exercise sound judgment in
support of the commander’s intent.2 In this manner, US Army General
Ulysses S. Grant conveyed he would not dictate a plan to Major General
William T. Sherman in 1864, but admonished him to “execute [work]
in your own way.”3 This exchange makes it clear the mission command
concept has long been with America’s army even though the term was
not introduced in the doctrine until 2003.4
America’s joint and army definitions of mission command are
common in spirit but different in detail. Mission command in joint
doctrine is “the conduct of military operations through decentralized
execution based upon mission-type orders, [which direct] a unit to
perform a mission without specifying how it is to be accomplished.”5
The US Army defines the approach as
the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission
orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to
empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations. . . . [It] emphasizes centralized intent and dispersed execution.6

This disciplined initiative is “action in the absence of orders,
when existing orders no longer fit the situation, or when unforeseen
opportunities or threats arise.”7 More verbose than the joint guidance,
there is little difference between the two definitions. The Army guidance
correctly observes that mission command is not the responsibility of
the senior alone. Subordinate leaders in staff and command positions
support their seniors by showing initiative and otherwise acting within
the dictates of higher echelon intent.
Consistent employment of mission command continues to prove
elusive in both the US and Australian armed forces. Clear communication
of a commander’s intent is fundamental to subordinate understanding
of what underlies an assigned mission. Intent—“a clear and concise
expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired military end
state helps subordinate and supporting commanders to act . . . even

2 Ibid.
3 Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of General Ulysses S. Grant (New York: Cosimo, 2007), 278.
4 John Case, “The Exigency for Mission Command: A Comparison of World War II Command
Cultures,” Small Wars Journal, November 4, 2014.
5 US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint
Publication 1-02, (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 2015), 158.
6 Headquarters, US Department of the Army (HQDA), Mission Command, Army Doctrine
Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-0 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 2012), 1-1. “Mission orders” are
defined as “directives that emphasize to subordinates the results to be attained, not how they are to
achieve them” (Ibid., Glossary-3).
7 Ibid, 2-4.
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when the operation does not unfold as planned”—allows junior leaders
to make appropriate decisions when confronted by the unforeseen.8
An omniscient commander could provide precise instructions
and the resources necessary for accomplishing every assigned task. No
such commander has yet graced history; thus, leaders need to provide
subordinates with an intent to guide judgment when conditions vary
from those envisioned. Simply stated, an effective intent conveys what
the commander wants his leaders and staff to remember when they face
the unanticipated.9
Clarity of orders and intent, decentralized decision-making, and
trust are the underpinnings that bring about unity of effort through
the exercise of mission command in Australia’s ground force as in the
US Army.10 Exercising mission command while avoiding unnecessary
risk receives explicit notice in Australian joint doctrine just as in the
American, the objective being flexibility and adaptability to respond
more effectively to the unexpected.11
Where US and Australian approaches diverge is in the amount of
doctrinal guidance provided. Australian doctrine tends to appreciate
mission command’s inherent simplicity of character better without
ignoring the difficulty of its proselytization. The desired end is no
different; the underlying wisdom is the same. But the Australian
Army seems satisfied with avoiding verbiage that obscures rather
than illuminates the philosophy. Offered in the spirit of multinational
cooperation (and simplicity), we will use its definition from here on:
Mission command is the practice of assigning a subordinate commander a
mission without specifying how the mission is to be achieved.12

We will see, however, that these few words demand much from senior
and subordinate alike.

Influences on Application

After the Roman commander Vespasian became the fourth
emperor during 69 AD, he chose his son Titus to complete the empire’s
suppression of a first century uprising in Galilee, Samaria, and Judea.
Vespasian’s choice was founded on more than nepotism. Titus had
demonstrated his expertise as a commander and experience relevant
to the tasks while campaigning alongside Vespasian in the preceding
years and while commanding away from his father’s direct oversight.
These and other factors caused Vespasian to trust Titus. Such trust
must obviously underlie decentralization. Commanders must trust
subordinates’ judgment and, in turn, subordinates must trust their
commander will back their decisions when their judgments have been
made in faith with seniors’ intentions.

8 Ibid, 2-3.
9 Russell W. Glenn, “The Commander’s Intent: Keep It Short,” Military Review 67 , no. 8
(August 1987): 51.
10 Australian Department of Defence (ADoD), Campaigns and Operations, Australian Defence
Doctrine Publication (ADDP) 3.0 (Canberra, ACT: ADoD, July 12, 2012), 2-3.
11 ADoD, Command and Control, ADDP 00.1 (Canberra, ACT: ADoD, 2009), 2-11.
12 Australian Army, LWD 1, 45
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Familiarity, which was obvious in the father-son relationship of
Vespasian and Titus, will also play a significant role in determining the
extent of operational freedom. That scope will differ from individual
to individual. The well-known junior commander with demonstrated
ability to function without close supervision merits less oversight than
one less familiar or proven; close supervision, less freedom of action, and
more specific guidance will be given to unproven leaders. A commander
accounts for his own ignorance by exercising greater control: the less
familiar he is with subordinates’ capabilities, the greater the need for
him to ensure his guidance is clear and followed. Time together before
pending operations and nature of the mission will influence the scope
of leeway bestowed—time as it may reassure the commander of new
subordinates’ abilities, mission because the most brilliant leader might
require increased supervision when pursuing objectives with which he
or she has less experience.
Greater familiarity and trust combined with a high level of
subordinate expertise would tend to result in less risk of decentralization.
Granting the same responsibility to a less proven or well-known
individual would qualify as imprudence. During World War II, German
General Friedrich-Wilhelm von Mellenthin drew on his considerable
experience when similarly noting “commanders and subordinates start
to understand each other during war. The better they know each other,
the shorter and less detailed the orders can be.”13
Subordinates’ experience and expertise, their demonstrated ability
to exercise good judgment under relevant operational conditions,
a commander’s familiarity with those individuals, the extent of trust
that senior leader imbues given these and other considerations are all
factors influencing the nature of guidance given to and freedom of
action bestowed upon each subordinate. There must be understanding
of why one individual receives more detailed guidance and closer
supervision than another. Trust will play a part, but trust has many
components. Lesser trust by no means need imply a senior questions the
judgment or reliability of a junior, but rather that those qualities are yet
unmeasured. Trust—from above to below and vice versa—comes only
with demonstrated performance, validation, and the passage of time.
Even the most dependable subordinate will find the diligent commander
occasionally ensuring his or her actions fall within bounds of the senior’s
intent. Subordinates have a responsibility to operate within those
bounds, to educate senior commanders when their unit is less familiar
to those above them in the chain of command, and to understand that
good commander’s check on performance.
Mission command in which both seniors and subordinates
understand their responsibilities is cultivated via training, including
instruction in military schoolhouses where junior noncommissioned and
commissioned officers learn their trade, where midgrade leaders acquire
staff and command tradecraft, and where seniors prepare for the pinnacles
of responsibility. Training incorporates instruction during exercises that
force decision-makers to deal with the unexpected and that allow senior
commanders to demonstrate well-intentioned even if less-than-perfect
13 As quoted in Eitan Shamir, Transforming Command: The Pursuit of Mission Command in the U.S.,
British, and Israeli Armies (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 106.
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judgments are not only allowable but demanded. Training encompasses
self-education guided by mentors and ensures subordinates read Grant,
British Field Marshal William Slim, and others whose command styles
demonstrate mission command at its best. And there is training through
one-on-one evaluations when the overly conservative and risk-averse
leader is told that his or hers is not an acceptable form of leadership.
Trust, familiarity, and expertise gained in training provide cornerstones
for applying mission command during operations whether the force
hails from the northern or southern hemisphere.
This discussion clearly establishes the application of mission
command should be conditional rather than absolute. One size does
not fit all. We have noted even familiar, completely trusted, and very
experienced subordinates require more command guidance under some
circumstances. Resource availability further influences the extent of
decentralization. Freedom of action when employing one’s own forces
will logically be greater than that involving allocation of low-density
assets on which multiple commands rely.14
A military’s culture also influences the nature of mission command.
The US resurrection of the practice during the last decade of the Cold
War was partially due to perceptions that fighting a larger Warsaw Pact
foe on Western Europe’s compartmented terrain meant leaders would
be unable to personally direct all their command elements. The agility
inherent in mission command practice was seen as an advantage over
those opponents, adversaries for whom extensive variation from plans
was antithetical.15 The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) were similarly
thought to favor highly decentralized tactical operations. Yet IDF
leaders proved uncomfortable with their military’s presumed extent of
decentralization. Those leaders instead opted for “selective control” in
which those exercising higher-echelon oversight provided mission-type
orders and expected initiative even as they tracked operations in detail,
remaining ever prepared to intervene should a situation appear to be
beyond a subordinate’s capabilities or should an opportunity arise that
otherwise might be lost.16
Israeli control has apparently become even further centralized in
succeeding years. While ground force units were assigned increased
numbers of air support liaison personnel during Operation Protective
Edge (2014) in Gaza, those at the sharp end had to request clearance
for danger close strikes from a centralized authority remote from
the battlefield.17 Some contrast British command approaches (and
presumably those of the Australian and other militaries with similar
cultural and historical ties) with those of America; the former rely on
assigned objectives communicated in quite general terms while US
leaders provide more detailed guidance in their orders. This greater
14 Ministry of Defence of the Netherlands, Command and Control, Joint Doctrine Publication 5
(The Hague: Doctrine Branch, Netherlands Defence Staff, 2012), 59.
15 Douglas A. Pryer, “Growing Leaders Who Practice Mission Command and Win the Peace,”
Military Review 93, no. 6 (November-December 2013): 32.
16 David S. Alberts and Richard E. Hayes, “Command Arrangements for Peace Operations”
(Washington, DC: Command and Control Research Program, 1995), 69. Alberts and Hayes’ work
is summarized in Keith G. Stewart, “Mission Command: Problem Bounding or Problem Solving?,”
Canadian Military Journal 9, no. 4 (2009).
17 Russell W. Glenn, Short War in a Perpetual Conflict: Implications of Israel’s 2014 Operation Protective
Edge for the Australian Army, Army Research Paper 9 (Canberra, ACT: Australian Army, 2016), 93.
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specificity is thought to dictate more regarding how objectives are to be
accomplished, resulting in less freedom of action by commanders on the
receiving end.18
Variations in application are not limited to those between national
militaries. Other-than-armed forces organizations have in recent years
recognized value in adopting a mission command-type philosophy. The
Australian Fire and Emergency Services Council finds the approach
beneficial during its geographically-dispersed operations. Similar
to military conceptions of mission command, the council’s leaders
communicate a commander’s intent and ensure subordinates receive the
resources necessary to achieve both mission-specified ends and those
implied by the intent.19

The Australian Army’s Path

The moniker “mission command” originated nearly one hundred
years after the Australian Army first applied the practice on battlefields
dispersed across the globe. While soldiers fought at Gallipoli, Europe’s
Western Front, Palestine, and the Pacific Islands north of Australia, the
country’s leaders came to realize success required trust, decentralized
decision-making, guidance tailored to a man’s capabilities, and checking
to ensure subordinates acted within the constraints of that guidance.
Australia’s most senior commanders first fought as subordinates to the
British during the First World War and later to Americans during the
Second. That role did not preclude their adoption of what would later
become the core content of mission command.
Writing on World War I, Peter Pedersen observed that by 1918
Australian “divisional commanders were now proven . . . that allowed
higher commanders to apply a light touch to the tiller.”20 At times
Australia’s senior alliance partners in these confl icts must have provided
insights on command worthy of emulation. Unfortunately, they most
assuredly supplied negative examples. American General Douglas
MacArthur and his staff made little attempt to decentralize decisionmaking in his Southwest Pacific Area, an approach that while contrary
to British Field Service Regulations referenced by the Australian Army
at the time, was in keeping with the 1939 edition of US Army Field
Service Regulations stipulating “so long as a commander can exercise
effective control he does not decentralize.”21 Such tension would
characterize Australian-US Army relations for the duration of fighting
in the Southwest Pacific as MacArthur and his staff believed the failure
of Australian Army commanders to provide detailed guidance to
subordinates demonstrated faulty planning while the Australians were
irritated consequently by the demonstrable lack of trust.
18 Alberts and Hayes, “Command Arrangements,” 70.
19 Euan Ferguson, “Mission Command for Fire and Emergency Managers: A Discussion
Paper,” Australian Fire and Emergency Services Council (AFAC), May 2014, http://www
.cfabellarine.com/uploads/1/3/0/0/13001256/mission_command_discussion_paper_may
_2014.pdf.
20 Peter Pedersen, “Mission command and the Australian Imperial Force,” in Trust and Leadership:
The Australian Army Approach to Mission Command (working title), ed. Russell W. Glenn (Annapolis,
MD: Naval Institute Press, forthcoming).
21 US War Department, Operations, Tentative Field Service Regulations FM 100-5 (Washington,
DC: War Department, 1939), 34, as quoted in Peter Dean, “Mission Command in World War II:
Australia, MacArthur’s General HQ and the Southwest Pacific Area,” in Trust and Leadership.
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The passage of time did not heal all wounds. Antipathies would arise
anew when Australian soldiers served under American commanders
in Vietnam. The friction between Australian and US commanders
tended to occur at upper echelons. Australian doctrine emphasized
population security based on earlier counterinsurgency operations in
Malaya and North Borneo. Initial tensions arose due to General William
Westmoreland’s given priority, the destruction of the North Vietnamese
army and Viet Cong enemies. Though that emphasis underwent a degree
of modification with the promotion of Creighton W. Abrams upon
Westmoreland’s departure, Australia’s senior in-country leaders found
themselves caught between what they thought was Abrams’ move away
from a priority of force-on-force operations and the dictates of the II
Field Force Vietnam Commanding General Lieutenant General Julian
J. Ewell (April 1969–April 1970).
Australian Major General Robert Hay, commander, Australian
Force Vietnam, found Ewell’s guidance not only contradictory to both
Australia’s preferred approach and Abrams’ intent but also unnecessarily
detailed. Historian Bob Hall noted,
“Ewell’s directives show[ed] a commander intent on directing his subordinates in detail, instructing them to increase enemy casualties via more
‘company days in the field’ with ‘30 to 40% of company effort’ on night
offensive operations and ambushes. Directives further dictated policies
regarding zeroing of rifles, marksmanship training, ambush techniques and
patrolling, and how best to integrate new reinforcements. A later memorandum urged subordinate commanders not to employ their troops on
population security tasks ‘unless it’s quite clear that the hamlet will be lost
unless we step in.’ ”22

The result presented a dichotomy for Australian forces. While reliance
on often highly dispersed small unit tactics meant mission commandtype approaches were characteristic of battalion and below operations,
the country’s military leaders serving above that echelon frequently
found themselves working around the dictates of US commanders to
shield subordinates from what they thought were inappropriate and
overly detailed orders.
Subsequent Australian contingencies provided repeated opportunities for refining command approaches suitable to leaders operating
distant from their senior commanders, not infrequently in environments
lacking reliable communications. Australian soldiers found themselves
in Somalia, East Timor, the Solomon Islands, and with the arrival of
the new millennium, Afghanistan and Iraq. The challenges associated
with successfully practicing mission command during these more recent
contingencies were less multinational in nature than internal. Such was
particularly the case with subordinate interpretations of the meaning of
mission command. Senior and subordinate alike understood the need
for decentralized decision-making within the constraints of a mission
and commander’s intent. Some senior commanders were surprised
by subordinates’ perspectives on those seniors’ visits to check that
performance reflected higher-level guidance.
22 Headquarters, Australian Forces Vietnam, “Memorandum to HQ II Field Force Vietnam,”
April 16, 1969, AWM98, R569-1-196, Operations-General-II Field Force Vietnam Operational
Directives, Australian War Memorial. Quoted in Bob Hall, “A Long Bridge in Time: The 1st
Australian Task Force in Vietnam via Malaya and Borneo,” in Trust and Leadership.
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Lieutenant Colonel Chris Smith was among those taken aback
during his battle group (battalion task force-equivalent) command tour
in Afghanistan. Investigating a report of a negligent discharge, Smith
determined that a round from an unauthorized AK-47 had nearly
struck an Australian soldier. The weapon had been stored behind the
driver’s seat of a vehicle for a period of weeks if not months. When
Smith questioned the responsible section commander (equivalent to
a US Army squad leader) regarding whether he inspected his drivers’
vehicles, the junior leader stated he did not, believing it to be a breach of
the trust between himself and his subordinates. The section commander
also made it clear that he considered Smith’s checks a breach of trust.
Further discussion failed to convince the section commander of his
responsibility to ensure both his and his seniors’ guidance was followed;
rather than a breach of trust, not checking was a failure of leadership
that reflected a deeply flawed understanding of the responsibilities
inherent in mission command. Recalling the incident, Smith observed
such practices led to “shoddy practices and casual attitudes.”23
Understanding what mission command requires from senior and
subordinate alike continues to challenge Australia’s professional army
no less than America’s primary ground force. The definitions might
seem clear. Yet too many leaders find the courage to exercise the full
spectrum of mission command responsibilities overly daunting. Too
many subordinates also cease listening upon hearing mission command
encourages decentralization of decision-making; they choose to ignore
the responsibility to check that decisions and behaviors are in keeping with
the commander’s guidance. Rooted in distant history, its value already
repeatedly proven in twenty-first century operations, full understanding
and effective practice of mission command remain elusive.

Concluding Observations

Australia’s and America’s armies face similar challenges in
employing mission command. While many leaders have the courage to
trust and decentralize, too many remain committed to hypercontrol,
the antithesis of effective application. Of notable significance given
Australian commanders’ experiences and American commanders’
comments, subordinates recognize the two-way nature of mission
command: it is not “fire and forget.” Rather, senior commanders have
the responsibility to confirm those more junior understand and operate
within the constraints of higher-echelon intent and mission. These are
not the only similarities between the two professional armies, however.
Americans and Australians operating together find more in common
than otherwise. Historians, politicians, and soldiers tend to emphasize
the differences and resulting frictions that arise during coalition
operations. Mission command instead offers a common foundation on
which to build multinational cooperation.
The paragraphs above establish a conditional nature of mission
command is needed to adapt guidance and supervision in light of
subordinates’ abilities. What should be unconditional, however, is
the approach’s application throughout an army. Fear of a subordinate
23 Chris Smith, “Mission Command and the 2RAR Battle Group in Afghanistan: A Case Study
in the Relationship between Mission Command and Responsibility,” in Trust and Leadership.
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making a mistake that might threaten a senior leader’s career tightens
centralization.24 Enhanced communications technologies become
implements of intrusion on junior leaders’ decision-making. Those in
helicopters overhead during operations in Vietnam at least realized that
jungle foliage or elephant grass blocked much of their vision. There
are no such obvious fi lters when looking at a computer screen’s false
clarity. “Train to trust” and “train to take appropriate risk” must be
building blocks for propagating mission command. The commander
who tolerates otherwise is an obstacle to that nurturing.
Operations in the opening years of the twenty-first century
increasingly demand a comprehensive approach involving all services,
multiple nations with several government agencies from each, and
capabilities only other-than-government organizations such as
nongovernmental organizations, intergovernmental associations, and
commercial enterprises can bring to the table. Decentralization is a
given; such operations will never see unity of command. Unity of
effort is perhaps an achievable goal with various organizations’ efforts
orchestrated via a commonly agreed upon general intent. Mission
command’s cornerstones—clear intent, trust, initiative, understanding
of context and objectives sought, familiarity with subordinates,
decentralization, and the courage to accept risk—are attainable regardless
of background. Leaders, military and civilian alike, recognize the need
to employ comprehensive approaches better. Mission command offers
a means of achieving the orchestration essential to success whichever
nation or organization is in charge.
Common understanding of the approach similarly offers opportunities to share concerns and insights in its application. Increasingly
sophisticated communications technologies, for example, should
reinforce calls for better inculcation of mission command throughout a
military. Subordinates will have to turn to the commander’s intent when
communications fail due to either enemy antipathy or nature’s hand.
Organizations unable to practice effective mission command will find
themselves at a disadvantage when facing commanders who “receive
general operating guidelines but have significant autonomy to run their
own operations” as do those in the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant.25
What does this mean for the American commander fortunate
enough to have an Australian unit under command?26 That those
partners would be no less professional than their own soldiers is a given
as is the reality that doctrinal, leadership, and other differences will
merit recognition and respect by all parties involved. There will almost
certainly be constraints under which the commanders of Australian
units operate differently than those imposed by America’s political or
higher-echelon military leaders. Mission command in a multinational
environment may be better practiced in an inquisitive rather than
directive mode. Clear statement of the higher echelon’s mission and
24 Gary Luck, Mission Command and Cross-Domain Synergy, Insights and Best Practices Focus
Paper (Suffolk, VA: Joint Chiefs of Staff J7 Deployable Training Division, 2013), 4.
25 Eric Schmitt and Ben Hubbard, “ISIS Leader Takes Steps to Ensure Group’s Survival,” New
York Times, July 20, 2015.
26 The Australian Army currently has three maneuver brigades, which are the largest units an
American commander might find in partnership. Battle groups or regiments (respectively equivalent
to US battalion task forces or battalions) are the more likely. Australia deployed battle groups to Iraq
and Afghanistan during the first decade of this century.
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intent will be no less crucial. Savvy commanders have realized, however,
that determining how a multinational partner will support said mission
and intent may require an approach significantly different than one with
US subordinates.
Directing specific actions to be taken by partners can cross “no go”
lines established by their seniors, leaving them no other option than
refusing to comply. No less than adapting the extent of guidance given
to a subordinate depending on the individual’s capabilities, a senior
commander must mold his mission command approach to multinational
conditions. Stating the higher echelon mission and intent, then asking
how a multinational partner might best support establishes a basis for
successful coalition operations and avoids straying into red card territory.
Consideration of the Australian Army’s approach to mission
command provides an opportunity to draw on the experiences of an able
ally. Australian leaders’ experiences reveal challenges inherent in mission
command span national boundaries. They include not only the necessity
of understanding and adhering to the concept’s tenets but also the everpresent challenge of persuading over-controlling leaders to adapt their
ways. So too, experiences in both countries bring to the forefront the
less recognized requirement to convince leaders and subordinates alike
that, properly applied, mission command reinforces rather than replaces
the age-old dictum that soldiers do well what leaders check.

